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Dissociative identity disorder (DID), formerly
known as multiple personality disorder, is cate-
gorized as an extreme form of dissociative disor-
der. It is characterized by the presence of two or
more distinct identities or personality states within
a single person and at least two of these identities
or personality states recurrently take control of
the person’s behavior, resulting in amnesia with
regard to important personal information.1 The
fascinating and mysterious symptoms attract the
attention of the public as well as the mental health
profession. However, suspicion as to whether DID
really exists, the concern of iatrogenesis and the
doubt of malingering never cease.
There have been an increasing number of crim-
inal cases and legal commentaries on DID in
North America in the past two decades.2 The dis-
continuity in personal experiences, memories and
identity goes beyond the concept of a person as
defined by the law, so this phenomenon causes
great debates in the evaluation of criminal respon-
sibility and competence. There is no report on
DID-related legal issues in Taiwan. Hence, a foren-
sic evaluation of civil competence for a client with
alleged DID provides an opportunity to examine
the fundamental issues regarding the nature of
civil competence and the practice of its forensic
evaluation.
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This report presents the results of forensic evaluation of the civil competence of a case of alleged dissocia-
tive identity disorder (DID) and discusses whether such dissociative states substantially jeopardize civil
competence. A 40-year-old woman claimed that she had had many personalities since her college days.
From the age of 37 to 40, she shopped excessively, which left her with millions of dollars of debt. She 
ascribed her shopping to a certain identity state, over which she had no control. (In this article, we use 
the term identity state to replace personality as an objective description of a mental state.) She thus raised 
the petition of civil incompetence. During the forensic evaluation, it was found that the identity states
were relatively stable and mutually aware of each other. The switch into another identity state was some-
times under voluntary control. The subject showed consistency and continuity in behavioral patterns across
the different identity states, and no matter which identity state she was in, there was no evidence of im-
pairment in her factual knowledge of social situations and her capacity for managing personal affairs. We
hence concluded that she was civilly competent despite the claimed DID. Considering that the existence
and diagnosis of DID are still under dispute and a diagnosis of DID alone is not sufficient to interdict 
a person’s civil right, important clinical and forensic issues remain to be answered. [J Formos Med Assoc
2007;106(10):878–882]
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Ms L, now aged 40, received forensic evaluation
after the request of her husband for interdiction
of her civil competence on account of her alleged
multiple personality disorder. (We have modi-
fied some basic data to maintain the subject’s
anonymity.)
A history revealed that Ms L claimed to have
several “personalities”, whose appearances could
be traced back to her college days, and the per-
sonalities (identity states) had evolved gradually
over the years. (In this article, we use the term
identity state to replace personality as an objective
description of a mental state.) In the past 15 years,
there were at least three host identity states. (In re-
ports of DID, host personality refers to the identity
state which takes control of the body for the ma-
jority of the time and interacts with others during
a specific period of time.) Identity state A emerged
after she was raped in college, and was dominant,
hot-tempered and self-centered. Identity state B
was the host personality at her first psychiatric
visit at the age of 35, and had been the dominant
one for years prior to the visit. Identity state F
was introverted, sentimental and good at writing.
Although these host identity states had distinct
self-images, demeanors and interests, they seemed
to have common characteristics such as impulsive-
ness, moodiness, tendency to somatization (fre-
quent headache, tinnitus, dizziness), and a strategy
of coping with stress by shopping excessively.
Switches between the identity states were sudden
and accompanied by amnesia of other identity
states. These identity states, when they were not
the dominant one, might emerge transiently to
serve her emotional or practical needs.
She had received mood stabilizers, antidepres-
sants, benzodiazepines and hypnotics because of
low mood, irritability, and insomnia in the 4 years
after her first psychiatric visit. She also undertook
irregular psychotherapeutic sessions when in iden-
tity B. Although she reported that she had no
memory of her lives before the age of 20, she did
disclose that she had been sexually harassed in
elementary school and raped in college. Despite
the obvious contradictions, she asserted that she
had “resumed the memory” from her dreams.
At the age of 37, she developed a new identity
C after discovering her husband’s extramarital af-
fair. Nevertheless, she was able to maintain her
regular life functions and social interactions with
a consistent behavioral pattern in identity C. The
psychotherapy and outpatient clinic visits contin-
ued irregularly. She reported that two other iden-
tity states with regressive characters coexisted at
that time, but they appeared only transiently under
emotional distress and had little impact on her
daily life and judgment over personal affairs.
At the age of 38 and while in identity C, she
was hospitalized as a result of a suicide attempt
that had been precipitated by intense conflicts
with her husband and entangled intimate rela-
tionships with male friends. During the 30-day
period of hospitalization, she remained in iden-
tity state C stably, and only one short switch last-
ing for half a day was documented. She claimed
that identity C resorted to buying sprees to re-
lieve the emotional distress, which had led to a
financial crisis amounting to millions of NT dol-
lars. The debts intensified the couple’s conflicts,
and she was hospitalized again after a drug over-
dose at the age of 40. During that admission, she
reverted to identity B and further alleged that a
new identity E with a destructive character was
going to emerge. She reported that E came out
and slashed herself despite strong oppositions
from the host identity state B. Nevertheless, objec-
tive evidence suggested that the self-harm action
was premeditated by identity state B, with the
implication that the intention of identity B was
carried out by identity E, meaning that a series of
purposeful actions were completed by different
identity states. According to the medical records,
no matter which identity state she was in, she had
a coherent memory, intact orientation, and ade-
quate social judgment. No psychotic symptom was
ever documented.
The physical and neurologic examinations of
Ms L revealed no abnormal finding. Routine lab-
oratory examinations and electroencephalogra-
phy were within normal limits. She reported no
history of systemic disease or head trauma and
denied substance abuse. The psychologic test re-
vealed an average intelligence of 105 (WAIS-R).
Personality assessments showed higher scores in
aspects of hypochondriasis, insecurity, and sex-
ual inhibition. The Rorschach test showed no 
evidence of impairment of reality testing.
Overall, Ms L had several new identity states
with periods of alleged amnesia, which could not
be explained by general medical problems, de-
mentia and substance abuse. Although the descrip-
tion fitted the characteristics of DID according 
to the diagnostic criteria of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition,
Text-Revised (DSM-IV-TR),1 dissociative fugue,
factitious disorder or malingering had to be ex-
cluded. Dissociative fugue was precluded on the
accounts that Ms L had several identity states and
had no wandering behaviors during the entire
course. However, factitious disorder and malin-
gering could not be completely ruled out.
At the forensic evaluation, she presented her-
self as being in identity state B and had full knowl-
edge of the nature and procedures of the legal
process. However, she later suddenly switched to
identity A, which she alleged had been dormant
for many years. Identity A was rude and verbally
abusive and claimed that she knew nothing about
the legal issues at hand. She could later switch
back to identity B at the evaluator’s request. The
bi-directional switches between identities A and B
were clearly under her voluntary control. Further-
more, she described that the identity states com-
municated with one another by diary, and were
aware of the others’ thoughts and behaviors by
direct observation “inside” or by consolidating
them as memory through dreams. She also re-
ported that the identity states could mimic each
other so well that her husband could not differ-
entiate between them.
Both the identity states B and A of Ms L were
judged to be competent through their presence
at the forensic evaluation. Although C was not
directly observable, her medical records showed
that C was stable enough to handle social affairs
adequately. Overall, considering that each of the
alleged host identity states lasted up to years and
none had severe psychopathology sufficient to
jeopardize her capacity for reality and social judg-
ments, we concluded that the client was civilly
competent.
Discussion
To evaluate the civil competence of a person with
alleged DID, some important issues specific to the
diagnosis arise. Medically, the existence of DID
remains doubtful, and it is difficult to exclude the
possibility of feigning or malingering. Legally, the
proclaimed coexistence of multiple personalities
within a single body challenges the concept of 
a person in the context of civil law and traditional
tests for civil competence.
There have been relentless disputes over the
genuineness of the dramatic symptomatology,
marked discrepancies in reported prevalence across
nations, hypothetical etiology, and the possibility
of iatrogenesis of DID.3–5 The number of alters in
DID sometimes number more than 100, and the
characters of the alters can be of an implausible
nature, such as different races/sex, animals, ghosts
and God. (In reports of DID, alter refers to the
identity state that is different from the host per-
sonality.) Both render the existence of DID highly
in doubt. The changes in the presentations of
DID over time are also notable. Some of the early
patients clearly had organic cerebral disorders,3,5
and others might be fugue or simple hypnotic
state, which is very different from the DID cases
observed today.3 The dramatic increase in the pre-
valence of DID after the 1980s and the clustering
of cases only in specific areas of North America
also suggest possible local conceptual and practice
biases, despite the argument that the increase is
due to improved awareness/diagnosis of DID and
the increasing disclosure of childhood abuses.6
Although proponents of DID assert that DID is
associated with overwhelming childhood trauma,
especially physical or sexual abuse, hence sugges-
tive of its post-traumatic nature, the memories of
the childhood trauma might be unreliable, since
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most of the reports of DID had no objective med-
ical records of abuse and the characteristics and
severity of the childhood trauma in their data were
poorly defined.3 It is also notable that there were
rare reports of childhood DID, contrasting sub-
stantially with the high prevalence of childhood
trauma reported in adult cases. Another highly
disputed issue is the possibility of the iatrogenesis
of DID. The disorder appears almost exclusively in
the context of psychotherapy or under hypnosis.4
The alters were reported to be produced under the
suggestions and recommendations of the thera-
pist, who thereby reinforced the DID phenomena
consciously or unconsciously.
Given the background, DID cannot be con-
sidered an etiologically sound disease entity.
Although some diagnostic instruments, such as 
the Structure Clinical Interview for Dissociative
Disorders-Revised, the Multidimensional Inven-
tory of Dissociation and Briere’s Multiscale Disso-
ciation Inventory,2 have been reported to achieve
good reliability,7 they still depend heavily on self-
reported personal experiences and can hardly meet
the standards of the reliability of expert testimony
as required by law, for example in the case of
Daubert v Merrell Dow pharmaceuticals: (1) whether
the expert’s theory is falsifiable and has been
tested; (2) the reliability of a procedure and its
potential rate of error; (3) whether the theory has
been subjected to peer review and the results have
been published; and (4) whether the expert’s
methods and reasoning enjoy general acceptance
in a relevant scientific community.4 Furthermore,
the symptoms of DID are very difficult to prove
to be true or false, and even an experienced DID
expert cannot provide a reliable procedure to dif-
ferentiate so-called real DID from malingering.5
In this regard, the reliability of the assessments
of the associated phenomena remains elusive.
If the testimony of the diagnosis of DID should
survive the reliability test, the characteristics of
DID—the appearance of personality states that
recurrently take control of an individual’s behav-
ior with amnesia—might shake the concept of a
personhood fundamentally and subvert the purview
of standard rules for competence and criminal
responsibility.6–10 Arguments arise over the fol-
lowing issues: (1) if the amnesia of DID impairs
the capacity to stand trial; (2) if different alters
should be treated as independent people with
separable legal rights and responsibility; (3) if the
age of the alter should be considered; and (4) if all
alters should be punished because of one alter’s
unlawful conduct. The courts of America have as-
sessed the criminal responsibility of DID in three
ways—by examining the mental status of the alter
present at the time of the crime (State v Grimsley,
1982); by examining the mental status of the host
personality at the time the crime occurred (U.S. v
Denny-Shaffer, 1993); by examining the mental
status of all the individual alters at the time of
the crime (State v Rodrigues, 1984). According to
Slovenko, the trend in the courts is moving 
towards “focusing on the personality allegedly
committing the offence” rather than “viewing the
person as a composite of a severely disrupted per-
sonality structure with a lack of psychological 
integration”.9 Behnke emphasized the distinction
between the concept of “the personality or men-
tal state” and that of the “person”, and argued that
the former was at most characteristics or proper-
ties belonging to the later.8 Thus, the responsi-
bility is not attributable to a certain mental state
or identity state, but should be considered accord-
ing to the person as a whole. What is relevant to
the law is the psychologic phenomena observed
in the person and the influences those phenom-
ena have on the person’s judgment and behavior.
Overall, the courts often hold that amnesia does
not preclude the capacity to stand trial, and DID
is not always accepted as a mental disease or de-
fect leading to acquittal by reason of insanity.7–9
The principle may be equally applicable in civil
competence evaluation.
According to Taiwan’s Civil Law, interdiction
of civil competence can be approved by the court
only when “a person is in such a state of insanity
or some other infirmity that he cannot deal with
his own affairs” (Civil Code article 14). To “deal
with one’s own affairs”, one must be capable of
being aware of social situations with factual under-
standing of relevant issues, rational appreciation
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of the information and likely consequences. The
abilities are predicated on the premise of a person
being a unified being with continuity in identity,
experiences and memories, and hence to behave
in a consistent pattern and capability as recogniz-
able by other people. It is the very concept of
“continuity in identity, experiences and memories”
that DID is supposed to challenge traditional tests
of competence. Considering that the alters in DID
are sometimes mutually aware of each other and
switch voluntarily among themselves, the “unity
of a person” cannot be judged as disrupted. In
addition, the very fact that “fusion of personality
is possible without biological intervention sug-
gests that the patient possesses a latent capacity
to control dissociative phenomena”.10 In this re-
gard, although the client claimed to have different
identity states, and hence different capacities, we
have to examine the competence over different
identity states, the capacity of voluntary control of
the switches, and the influence which the switches
of identities and the interruption of memories/
experiences have on the civil competence of the
person as a whole.
Ms L claimed that her identity states changed,
but over an extended period of time, there was
only one specific identity state “in control of body”
and was competent in personal affairs. Although
she reported the existence of other identity states,
they only appeared transiently and had little in-
fluence on her daily life and personal judgments.
Also, the permeability of amnesic barriers, the
control over the switches, and the completion of
a series of actions by different identity states im-
plied that the continuity of Ms L’s experience was
not disrupted profoundly. When the interruption
of the continuity of experiences and memories is
not complete, and the switches of identities do not
significantly influence the judgment of personal
affairs and capacity to understand social situa-
tions, and when every host identity state is stable
enough to be recognized by others and judged to
be competent, the person as a whole cannot but
be competent. In this regard, despite the disputed
diagnosis of DID, the client’s current psycho-
pathology did not impair her civil competence.
In conclusion, when a person with presenta-
tions that fit the diagnosis of DID is presented to
the court, given the debates about the genuine-
ness of DID and the lack of reliable procedures
to test its validity, we suggest a higher level of clini-
cal discretion. To determine civil competence, we
have to evaluate the competence of each host iden-
tity state, the continuity of personal memories/
experiences, the capacity of voluntary control of
switches, and the influence of switches of identity
states on civil competence. The diagnosis of DID
does not automatically render a person civilly
incompetent.
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